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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
       eapon systems are becoming increasingly automated and arguably 
some autonomous military systems have been deployed for years. Recent 
advances in automated systems and the possibilities they portend have gen-
erated interest and anxiety within some militaries and defense ministries, 
and a movement of non-governmental activists seeking to ban fully auton-
omous weapons. In May 2014, the High Contracting Parties of the UN 
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Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) convened an exten-
sive discussion of the legal and ethical issues that autonomous weapons 
raise, while recognizing that many of these problems lie at an uncertain 
point in the future. 
It is important that normative development regarding autonomous 
weapon systems head down a path that is coherent and practical.1 By “au-
tonomous weapon systems,” we mean systems “that, once activated, can 
select and engage targets without further intervention by a human opera-
tor.” We draw this definition from a 2012 U.S. Department of Defense 
policy directive, which remains the most extensive public pronouncement 
by any State on how it intends to proceed with regard to research, devel-
opment and deployment of autonomous weapon systems.2 
This paper addresses several questions that are critical to charting such 
a path. First, are autonomous weapon systems different from other new 
weapon systems, and, if so, how? Second, to the extent they are different, 
can and should autonomous weapon systems be regulated within the 
framework of the existing law of armed conflict? If yes, how should States 
go about doing so? If not, what alternative regulatory approach is appro-
priate? 
We conclude that autonomous weapon systems have special features 
that pose risks and that create challenges in applying the existing law of 
armed conflict. Nevertheless, we conclude it is possible to adapt the exist-
ing framework to account for the features of autonomous weapons, and 
that the suggested alternative of prohibiting these systems outright is mis-
guided. Instead, we propose a three-tiered process for regulating the devel-
opment, deployment and use of autonomous systems. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                      
1. This paper expands on arguments laid out in Kenneth Anderson & Matthew 
Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems: Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the 
Laws of War Can, HOOVER INSTITUTION (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.hoover.org/research/law-and-ethics-autonomous-weapon-systems-why-ban-
wont-work-and-how-laws-war-can; also available as American University, WCL Research 
Paper 2013-11, Columbia Public Law Research Paper 13-351 (2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250126. 
2. U.S. Department of Defense, DoD Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Sys-
tems 13 (2012) [hereinafter DoD Directive 3000.09]. 
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II. THE INCREMENTAL DEVELOPMENT OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPON 
SYSTEMS 
 
Autonomous weapon systems have existed in some sense for a long time. 
Many anti-personnel landmines and undersea mines could be thought of as 
autonomous in that once deployed they were configured (originally me-
chanically and later electronically) to detonate based on physical contact or 
other signals associated with targets. Many did so in very unsophisticated 
ways, unable to distinguish much more than pressure or movement, let 
alone select between lawful and unlawful targets. Conceptually, at least, 
they might fit the definition of autonomy if “select” is construed to mean 
merely “triggered” rather than “selection among” targets. This paper fo-
cuses instead, however, on technologically sophisticated systems in which 
capabilities for “selection among” is a specific design aim for the weapon. 
Some modern and very sophisticated autonomous (or at least very highly 
automated) weapon systems already exist. These are generally limited to use 
in defensive contexts against other machines and are deployed in environ-
ments such as the air or sea in which civilian risk is very small, and with 
respect to which human operators activate and monitor the system and can 
override its operation. 
New autonomous weapon systems are gradually becoming incorpo-
rated into warfare as technology advances and capabilities increase one 
small automated step at a time. Increasing automation in weapons technol-
ogy results from advances in sensor and analytical capabilities and their in-
tegration into—and in response to the increasing tempo of—military oper-
ations. It also results from political pressures to protect not just one’s own 
personnel, but also civilian persons and property.3 Although automation 
will be a general feature across battlefield environments and weapon sys-
tems, genuine autonomy in weapons will probably remain rare for the fore-
seeable future and be driven by special factors such as speed and the tempo 
required of particular kinds of operations.4 
                                                                                                                      
3. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Op-Ed, Killer Robots and the Laws of War, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 2013, at A19, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304655104579163361884479576. 
4. See PETER SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CON-
FLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2009). For a dissenting view that removing humans from 
military targeting is unlikely for the foreseeable future, see Werner J. A. Dahm, Op-Ed, 
Killer Drones Are Science Fiction, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 15, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405297020488330457722159001547518
0. 
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“Automation” describes a continuum, and there are various ways to de-
fine places along it.5 Terms like “semi-autonomous,” “man-in-the-loop” 
and “man-on-the-loop” are used to convey different levels and configura-
tions of machine-human interaction and degrees of independent machine 
decision making.6 Rather than engaging in definitional debates, our analyti-
cal starting point is that new autonomous systems will develop incremen-
tally as more functions, not just of the weapon but also of the platform 
(e.g., the vehicle or aircraft), are automated. 
For example, intermediate levels of automation of weapon systems 
could include a robot that is pre-programmed to look for certain enemy 
weapon signatures and to alert a human operator of the threat, who then 
decides whether or not to pull the trigger. At a next level of automation, 
the system might be set with the human being not required to give an af-
firmative command, but instead merely deciding whether to override and 
veto a machine-initiated attack. Perhaps next the system would be designed 
to target and fire autonomously, but to wait and call for higher-level au-
thorization only when it assesses possible collateral damage above a certain 
level. In some cases, a human operator might control only a single or very 
few sets of sensor and weapon units. In others, he might control or over-
see an integrated network of sensor and weapon units. In still other cases, 
the move to automate the weapon system or even give it autonomy might 
be driven by automation of all the other non-weapon systems of the plat-
form with which the weapon has to be coordinated. Eventually, these sys-
tems may reach the point of full autonomy for which, once activated, the 
human role is vanishingly small. As explained below, the tipping point 
from a highly-automated system to an “autonomous” one is very thin and, 
in practice, unstable.  
Weapon systems that would be able to assess civilian status or estimate 
harm as part of their own independent targeting decisions, as in one of the 
above examples, do not exist today and research toward such capabilities 
currently remains in the realm of theory. Still, several modern highly-
automated—and some would call them autonomous—weapon systems 
already exist. These are generally for use in battlefield environments such 
as naval encounters at sea where risks to civilians are small, and are general-
                                                                                                                      
5. See DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS 3–5, 23–24 (2012). 
6. See William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the 
Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 1139 
(2013).  
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ly limited to defensive contexts against other machines in which human 
operators activate and monitor the system and can override its operation.7 
Examples include the U.S. Patriot and Phalanx anti-missile systems and 
Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile system.8 Many more could lie ahead for a 
variety of battlefield environments and military missions in a future that is 
becoming less and less distant.  
From a “demand-side” perspective, i.e., the needs of the military opera-
tor, increasing automation in weapons technology is an unsurprising re-
sponse to the increasing tempo of military operations in which, other 
things being equal, the faster system wins the engagement. Automation 
permits military systems of all kinds (not just weapons) to act more quickly 
than people can assess, calculate and respond, and sometimes to act more 
precisely and accurately in responding to a military threat. Some of the ear-
liest computational weapon systems emerged in World War II, such as the 
development of anti-aircraft guns that had rudimentary mechanisms for 
estimating trajectory and responding to enemy aircraft, targeting the antici-
pated path of the enemy bomber and firing in what, for that period, was 
high speed.9  
Speed of response is a demand of military necessity, certainly, but it is 
not simply a question of winning the engagement. Speed through automa-
tion or autonomy can also serve to make the use of force in battle more 
precise. By shortening the time between the positive identification of a tar-
get and its attack, there is less likelihood that the situation might have 
changed, the target have moved or civilians have come into proximity. In 
the Libya hostilities in 2011, for example, NATO-manned attack aircraft 
were reportedly too slow and had too little loiter time to permit accurate 
targeting of highly mobile vehicles on the ground in an urban battlefield 
                                                                                                                      
7. See INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT OF THE ICRC EX-
PERT MEETING ON “AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL 
AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS,” (May 9, 2014), available at http://www.icrc.org/ 
eng/assets/files/2014/expert-meeting-autonomous-weapons-icrc-report-2014-05-09.pdf 
[hereinafter REPORT OF ICRC EXPERT MEETING]. 
8. U.S. Navy Fact File, MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), http://www. 
navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2 (Nov. 15, 2013); Federa-
tion of American Scientists, MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), (Jan. 9, 2003), 
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-15.htm; Michael N. Schmitt & 
Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Out of the Loop: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 
4 HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231 (2013). 
9. Another example is the Norden Bombsight, a basic analog computer used by the 
U.S. Air Force in WWII to greatly increase bombing accuracy. 
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with many civilians. In response, an appeal was made to the United States 
to supply, first, surveillance drones, and then armed drones that could 
speed up the targeting process.10 Some version of this problem will drive 
demand for automation. On top of all this, there are always powerful pres-
sures domestically and internationally on armed forces for advanced weap-
on technology to protect not just one’s own personnel, but also civilian 
persons and property.  
From a “supply-side” perspective, increasing automation—and eventu-
ally autonomy—of weapon systems grows from ever-continuing advances 
in sensor and analytic technologies, machine-learning and their fusion. Im-
portantly, development of many of the enabling technologies of autono-
mous weapon systems—artificial intelligence and robotics, for example—
are being driven by private industry for many commercial and societally-
beneficial purposes (consider self-driving cars, surgical robots, and so on). 
They are developing and proliferating rapidly, independent of military de-
mand and investment.11 Such civilian automated systems are already mak-
ing daily decisions that have potential life and death consequences, such as 
aircraft landing systems. While most people are generally aware that these 
types of systems are highly automated (or even autonomous for some 
functions), and have become wholly comfortable with their use, relatively 
little public discourse has addressed the increasing decision-making role of 
autonomous systems in potentially life-threatening situations. To the extent 
that such automation and robotics technologies come to be widely under-
stood as more effective, safe and reliable than human judgment in many 
non-military realms, their use will almost certainly migrate into military 
ones. Indeed, future generations that perhaps come to routinely trust the 
computerized judgments of self-driving vehicles are likely to demand, as a 
moral matter, that such technologies be used to reduce the harms of war. It 
is largely a question of whether such systems work or not, and how well.  
                                                                                                                      
10. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Launches Drone Strikes in Libya, WALL STREET JOUR-
NAL, Apr. 22, 2011, at A6, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles 
/SB10001424052748704889404576277413211029304 (“Allied aircraft have proved unable 
to fully protect civilians and rebel forces under heavy attack from Gadhafi loyalists. The 
drones can get closer, allowing more-precise strikes, and loiter longer, giving them a better 
chance of finding hidden targets. . . . Drones have been used for reconnaissance missions 
from the start of the conflict, but in recent days, NATO commanders had asked the U.S. 
to provide armed Predator strikes.”). 
11. See ROBERT O. WORK & SHAWN BRIMLEY, 20YY: PREPARING FOR WAR IN THE 
ROBOTIC AGE 23–27 (2014).  
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No doubt, the use and especially proliferation of autonomous weapons 
will pose significant risks and challenges for law and regulation. We address 
below some legal objections to autonomous weapons as such. But it bears 
recognizing at the outset that, as with any technologically advanced weapon 
system, there are risks and dangers that include machine malfunction and 
machines whose design (hardware, software or interaction with human op-
erators) underperforms a legally essential task or produces unpredictable 
effects (including when autonomous weapon systems engage each other or 
not-fully predictable machine decisions resulting from probabilistic pro-
gramming or machine (self-) learning).12 Beyond issues of the autonomous 
weapon system itself, strategic or political issues include concerns about a 
State armed with autonomous weapons being too willing to resort to mili-
tary force because these weapons might reduce perceived risks to a side’s 
own soldiers or to civilians.13 Moreover, these systems might be thought to 
                                                                                                                      
12. For an introduction to robotics using machine self-learning and probabilistic pro-
gramming, see Ryan Calo, Robotics and the New Cyberlaw, 103 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 
101, 125–26 (forthcoming 2015), advance draft available at www.robotics businessre-
view.com/pdfs/roboticscyberlaw.pdf (describing how machine self-learning might pro-
duce machine behaviors that cannot be fully predicted in advance). For a technical intro-
duction to the probabilistic programming or machine learning utilized in, for example, 
Google’s self-driving cars, see SEBASTIAN THRUN, WOLFRAM BURGARD & DIETER FOX, 
PROBABILISTIC ROBOTICS (2005). For arguments, contra, that autonomous weapon systems 
will never in fact be able to perform adequately because of limitations of the ability to 
program their behaviors, see, e.g., Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot War-
fare, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 787 (2012), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review-2012/irrc-886-sharkey.htm. 
For arguments that as a matter of fundamental morality targeting and engagement deci-
sions should not be entrusted to robots, and raising concerns about accountability for 
mistake, errors and design flaws, see, e.g., Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Sys-
tems: Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INTER-
NATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 687 (2012), available at http://www.icrc.org/ 
eng/resources/documents/article/review-2012/irrc-886-asaro.htm; WENDELL WALLACH 
& COLIN ALLEN, MORAL MACHINES: TEACHING ROBOTS RIGHT FROM WRONG 47–48 
(2010). 
13. Autonomous weapon systems and remotely-piloted armed drones raise the same 
issue: whether the features of the weapon system that limit risk to soldiers and make it 
more discriminating with respect to civilians are, ironically, the very features that make it, 
on some views, not just easier for a party to resort to force, but “too easy” to do so. See, 
e.g., UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JDN 2/11, THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIR-
CRAFT SYSTEMS ch. 5 (2011); MEDEA BENJAMIN, DRONE WARFARE: KILLING BY RE-
MOTE CONTROL 124–43 (rev. ed. 2013). For a response, see Kenneth Anderson, Efficiency 
in Bello and ad Bellum: Making the Use of Force Too Easy?, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW 
AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 374 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin 
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undermine individual disciplinary and accountability systems in the law of 
armed conflict.14   
Note that many of these of these concerns—machine malfunction, 
marginal diminution of some political or ethical constraints on using force, 
and misuse or abuse—are not unique to autonomous weapons. They are 
true of many military technologies and long-standing targeting practices, 
including artillery, stand-off manned aircraft, missiles, rockets and other 
over-the-horizon weaponry. None of these weapon systems is regarded 
today as inherently illegal; the question is one of lawful use. 
Autonomous weapons also offer important potential benefits though, 
not only in terms of military effectiveness, but in terms of humanitarian 
protection as well. Existing systems mentioned earlier help protect friendly 
forces and populations from modes of attack that are too fast or complex 
for human reaction and decision making. Like remotely piloted vehicles, 
some autonomous weapon systems can operate without exposing person-
nel to the direct risk of enemy fire. This, in turn, reduces pressures on 
combatant personnel to resort to greater force to address threats, with the 
possibility of greater harms resulting to civilians and civilian objects. 
Autonomous weapon systems may also reduce risks to civilians by 
making targeting more precise and firing decisions more controlled, espe-
cially compared to human-soldier failings that are so often exacerbated by 
panic, vengeance or other emotions, as well as the limits of human senses 
and cognition. Empathy and sympathy are among the better angels of hu-
man nature, but one of Human Rights Watch’s significant claims in Losing 
Humanity—that a fundamental objection to autonomous weapon systems is 
that they take these emotions out of battlefield targeting and firing deci-
sions—flies in the face of how much of the structure of the law of armed 
conflict exists to address, imperfectly, the effects of human soldiers’ battle-
field emotions, starting with fear, anger and vengeance, exacerbated under 
conditions of hunger, exposure, uncertainty and so on.15 The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has taken a sensibly cautious ap-
proach to this question, observing in a 2011 report that “emotion, the loss 
                                                                                                                      
& Andrew Altman eds., 2012), available as Efficiency in Bello and ad Bellum: Targeting Killing 
Through Drone Warfare at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1812124. 
14. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILL-
ER ROBOTS sec. VI (Problems of Accountability for Fully Autonomous Weapons) (2012), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/11/19/losing-humanity-0 [hereinafter LOS-
ING HUMANITY]. 
15. Id. at 37–38.  
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of colleagues and personal self-interest is not an issue for a robot, and the 
record of respect for IHL by human soldiers is far from perfect, to say the 
least.”16 Weapon systems with greater and greater levels of automation 
could—at least in some battlefield contexts—reduce misidentification of 
military targets, better detect or calculate possible collateral damage, or al-
low for using a smaller quanta of force compared to human decision mak-
ing.17 
That is not to say that autonomous systems do not raise some difficult 
issues. Perhaps foremost among these is the fact that as machine-learning 
and artificial intelligence technologies develop, it is becoming increasingly 
clear that human beings may not necessarily always be able to understand 
how (and possibly why) autonomous systems make decisions. In some cas-
es, this is a question of the complexity of the system, making it realistically 
impossible to fully predict in advance how the system will behave, to un-
derstand the reasoning behind the system’s decision making as it happens 
or even to reconstruct after the fact how it did behave. In other cases, the 
nature of the programming is probabilistic, making it impossible to know 
with complete certainty what the machine’s decision will be.18 This realiza-
tion may lie at the core of many of the fears and concerns that have fueled 
the campaign to ban autonomous systems, discussed further below. But are 
autonomous weapon systems truly “game changers,” with respect to the 
seeming loss of direct human control over weapons and their use on the 
battlefield?  
We do not believe they are. Even today, operators of highly-automated 
military equipment, similar to users of civilian technology, quite often have 
very little idea as to exactly how the technology they are using functions 
internally as an electronic system, nor even the logical process of how the 
system reaches results, conclusions or decisions. And yet, the fact that we 
do not understand the internal mechanics (or electronics or software pro-
                                                                                                                      
16. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANI-
TARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICT: REPORT 
PREPARED FOR THE 31ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS AND RED 
CRESCENT 40 (2011), available at  http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/ 
31-international-conference-ihl-challenges-report-2011-10-31.htm [hereinafter ICRC 31ST 
CONFERENCE REPORT]. 
17. See Shane R. Reeves & William J. Johnson, Autonomous Weapons: Are You Sure These 
Are Killer Robots? Can We Talk About It?, ARMY LAWYER, Apr. 2014, at 25–26.  
18. See Calo, supra note 12, at 125–26 (discussion of “emergent behavior” and ma-
chine learning enabling the machine to self-improve, but with possibly unpredictable 
learning paths and results). 
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gramming) of a system does not mean that we are unable to use such a sys-
tem within our existing rule structures. It also does not mean that the hu-
mans operating the equipment do not have a general understanding of the 
operating parameters of the system and its general capabilities and limita-
tions. As will be discussed in further detail below, the law’s focus has al-
ways been—and should continue to be—on (a) ensuring that a weapon 
system is not inherently unlawful and (b) ensuring that the individual sol-
dier or commander deploying or activating the lawful weapon system does 
so in accordance with the laws of warfare, to include ensuring that such 
systems are not deployed in situations for which they were not designed 
and which could cause unnecessary or unjustified harm. This important 
relationship between the weapon system and its human operator will run 
true for autonomous systems as well. 
 
III. MISGUIDED CALLS TO PROHIBIT AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS PER SE 
 
Some critics argue that legal and ethical deficiencies of autonomous weap-
ons—or the policy tendencies that autonomous weapon capabilities would 
unleash—demand that such systems be prohibited. The assumptions be-
hind calls to ban autonomous weapon systems and the form of proposed 
bans vary. 
Some doubt that technology can ever be good enough to make suffi-
ciently precise decisions to meet the legal and ethical requirements of dis-
tinction or proportionality, which are discussed below.19 Others believe 
that these legal or ethical principles inherently require human judgment—
that lethal targeting is or should always be guided directly by a moral agent 
who can be held accountable for culpable failures.20 And others 
acknowledge that though autonomous weapon systems may not be unlaw-
ful under existing law, especially since technological development is uncer-
tain and what costs and benefits any particular system might offer is today 
merely speculative, they nevertheless should be banned (at least for the 
foreseeable future, pending thorough international discussion and agree-
                                                                                                                      
19. See LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 14, at 30–35; Noel Sharkey, Op-Ed, America’s 
Mindless Killer Robots Must Be Stopped, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/03/mindless-killer-robots. 
20. See, LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 14, at 35–36; Asaro, supra note 12. 
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ment as to their proper legal framework) as a prophylactic precautionary 
measure because of risks they pose, both known and unknown.21 
One way to ban—or to interpret existing law as banning—autonomous 
weapons is to define some maximum level of autonomy for any weapon 
system and prohibit any machine system that exceeds it. A variant ap-
proach is to define some minimum legal level of human control. Human 
Rights Watch, for example, has called for a preemptive “ban [on] fully au-
tonomous weapons,” which “should apply to robotic weapons that can 
make the choice to use lethal force without human input or supervision.” 
It also proposes to ban their “development, production, and use,” as well 
as calling for “reviews” of “technologies and components that could lead 
to fully autonomous weapons.”22 The International Committee for Robot 
Arms Control, an organization dedicated to reducing threats from military 
robotics, calls for the “prohibition of the development, deployment and 
use of armed autonomous unmanned systems.”23 A British non-
governmental organization dedicated to the regulation of certain weapons 
argues that lethal decision making should require “meaningful human con-
trol.”24 This idea of requiring a minimum level of “meaningful human con-
trol” emerged as a major theme in discussions among States and advocacy 
groups at the 2014 UN CCW meeting.25 Instead of encouraging a perma-
                                                                                                                      
21. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Report, 
20–21, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) (by Chris-
tof Heyns) [hereinafter Report of the Special Rapporteur]. It appears that for some in the 
autonomous weapons debate, either a ban or moratorium is a virtuous application of 
some form of the precautionary principle—generically, a policy heuristic of “first, do no 
harm” (i.e., prefer little risk of harm or reduction of risk even if it means giving up large 
potential benefits). See, e.g., Brian Rappert et al., The Roles of Civil Society in the Development of 
Standards around New Weapons and Other Technologies of Warfare, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF THE RED CROSS 765, 767 (2012) (endorsing “putting in place so-called precautionary 
measures . . . such as initially limiting use”).  
22. LOSING HUMANITY, supra note 14, at 46–47.  
23. Original Mission Statement, ICRAC, http://icrac.net/statements/ (last visited July 
29, 2014). 
24. Memorandum from Article 36 for Delegates to the Convention on Certain Con-
ventional Weapons (CCW), Article 36: Structuring Debate on Autonomous Weapon Sys-
tems (Nov. 2013), http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/ Autono-
mous-weapons-memo-for-CCW.pdf. 
25. See Chairperson of the Meeting of Experts, UN Convention on Certain Conven-
tional Weapons, Report of the 2014 Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous 
Weapons Systems (LAWS) ¶ 20, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/% 
28%20httpAssets%29/350D9ABED1AFA515C1257CF30047A8C7/$file/Report_Advan
cedVersion_10June.pdf (last visited July 29, 2014).  
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nent ban on autonomous weapons, Christof Heyns, the UN Special Rap-
porteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, has proposed a 
moratorium, calling for “all States to declare and implement national mora-
toria on the testing, production, assembly, transfer, acquisition, deployment 
and use of [lethal autonomous robotics] until such time as an international-
ly agreed upon framework . . .  has been established.”26 
Before addressing some of the enforceability problems and dangers of 
any effort to prohibit autonomous weapons, it is important to understand 
the proposed formulas do not, as it may seem initially, contain a bright line 
that would be useful for promoting adherence. Lawyers experienced in the 
law of armed conflict will quickly see that each of these seemingly clear-cut 
definitions leaves many open questions as to what systems would be 
banned under any particular formulation. Even something as seemingly 
plain as “lethal decision making” by a machine does not address, among 
other things, the lawfulness of targeting a tank, ship or aircraft which is 
ultimately the source of the threat, but inside of which is a human combat-
ant.  
Beyond definitions, the technology and basic architecture of an auton-
omous system and a nearly autonomous, highly automated system are basi-
cally the same—if you can build a system that is nearly autonomous, for 
example with human override, then you can probably reprogram it to elim-
inate that human role. Moreover, whether a highly automated system—say, 
one with a human supervisor who can override proposed firing deci-
sions—is in practice operating autonomously depends on how it is being 
manned, how operators are trained and how effectively oversight is exer-
cised. It also depends on operational context and conditions, which may 
limit the degree to which the human role is in any way meaningful. 
For these and other reasons, a fully autonomous system and a merely 
highly-automated system will be virtually indistinguishable to an observer 
without knowing a lot about how that system is used in particular opera-
tional conditions. The difference might not matter very much in practice, 
given the variable performance of human operators. In any case, these sys-
tems will be easily transitioned from one to the other. The blurriness of 
these lines means that it will be very difficult to draw and enforce prohibi-
tions on “fully” autonomous systems or mandates for minimum levels of 
human decision making. Given the great practical difficulty of distinguish-
ing between autonomous and highly automated systems, applying a legal 
                                                                                                                      
26. Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 21, at 21. 
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ban on autonomous systems would be relatively easy to circumvent and 
very difficult to enforce. 
At the same time, and as alluded to above, imposing a general ban on 
autonomous systems could carry some highly unfavorable consequences—
and possibly dangers. These could include providing a clear advantage in 
autonomous weapon technology to those States which generally would not 
join (or in reality comply with) such a ban. They could also include losing 
out on the numerous potential advantages of autonomous systems of im-
proving decision making on the battlefield, including through avoiding 
emotion-based response; improving system accuracy, thereby probably 
minimizing collateral injuries; and possibly limiting human loss of life on 
both sides and among civilians. 
  
IV. REGULATING THE USE OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS UNDER THE 
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
Calls for a prohibitory ban are usually based on creating new treaty law. 
Without a new treaty, however, any new weapon system must still comply 
in its design and usage with the law of armed conflict. Article 36 of Proto-
col I, for example, requires that “in the study, development, acquisition or 
adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contract-
ing Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment 
would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by 
any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Par-
ty.”27 Additionally, assuming a weapon is not per se illegal, its operational 
uses must also comply with the law of targeting.  
                                                                                                                      
27. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API]. Article 36 is widely regarded among scholars as expressing 
customary law with respect to “legal reviews of new means of warfare before their use is 
generally considered,” but such consensus is “lacking as to whether an analogous require-
ment exists to perform legal reviews of new methods of warfare.” Means of warfare refers 
to “weapons and weapon systems,” whereas methods refer to the “tactics, techniques, and 
procedures” by which hostilities are conducted. See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 
271. Given that neither the United States nor Israel is a party to Protocol I, and given that 
the authors include former national security government officials of each, we believe it 
prudent to observe that neither State appears to have expressed an official legal view as to 
the customary law status of each aspect of Article 36; however, the military establishments 
of both States have long maintained highly-developed and formalized processes for re-
viewing the legality of weapons. The processes are similar to what Article 36 requires of 
State parties to Protocol I.  
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The legality of the weapon itself turns on three basic rules.28 First, the 
weapon system cannot be indiscriminate by nature.29 This is not a question 
of whether there might be circumstances—the manner of use and battle-
field conditions—in which the weapon could not be aimed in a way to 
comply with the legal requirement of “distinction” between lawful military 
targets and civilians. That would be true of nearly any weapon, because any 
weapon could be deliberately misused. Rather, the rule runs to the nature 
of the weapon in the uses for which it was designed30 or, as some authorities have 
put it, its “normal” uses, i.e., the uses for which it was intended.31 As a mat-
                                                                                                                      
28. See, e.g., Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force, AFI51-402, Legal Reviews of 
Weapons and Cyber Capabilities 3.1.1, 3.1.2 (2011) (Technical legal guidance for the legal 
review of weapon systems, specifying the scope of legal review of weapons to encompass 
both specific treaty rules and customary law rules regarding the use of the weapon, and 
beyond that to consider, even in the absence of an express prohibition, whether the weap-
on is “of a nature” to inflict superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering upon combatants 
and whether it is “capable of being directed against a specific military objective and, if not, 
is “of a nature to cause an effect on military objectives and civilians or civilian objects 
without distinction.”). 
29. We leave aside here a number of technical complications. For example, notwith-
standing the use of “of a nature” by the U.S. Air Force weapons review guidance with 
respect to indiscriminate weapons, the language “of a nature” appears in Article 35(2) of 
the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, with reference not to indiscriminate 
weapons with respect to civilians, but only weapons of a nature to cause superfluous inju-
ry or unnecessary suffering to combatants. See API, supra note 27, art. 35(2). There is rea-
sonably widespread State practice and agreement that a similar concept applies to indis-
criminate weapons, with, however, considerable debate over the question of how this “na-
ture” is to be determined—whether by reference to a weapon’s design, “normal” purpose 
and use, etc. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
69–85 (2009). In general, we have followed the approach taken by both Boothby, and 
Schmitt and Thurnher.  
30. It bears noting that even the ban on blinding laser weapons—the leading example 
of a ban on a technologically advanced weapon that had not yet been deployed—is limited 
to “laser weapons specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their 
combat functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.” Protocol on 
Blinding Laser Weapons art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, 1380 U.N.T.S. 370. It underscores the gen-
eral rule that the lawfulness of a weapon as such turns on the use for which it was de-
signed or intended. 
31. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 62 (2d ed. 2010) (“It is necessary to differentiate between (a) weapons that are 
employed in specific circumstances contrary to the principle of distinction . . . and (b) 
weapons that by their very nature or design cannot possibly maintain the distinction in any 
set of circumstances. The fact that certain weapons are used indiscriminately in a particu-
lar military engagement does not stain the weapons themselves with an indelible imprint 
of illegality . . . .”). 
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ter of grounds to find a weapon unlawful, this is a tough standard and very 
few weapons are illegal per se because they are indiscriminate by nature. 
Rather, legal weapons are used in an indiscriminate manner—a serious vio-
lation of the law of armed conflict, certainly, but running to the actual use 
of the weapon.32 
Second, a lawful weapon system cannot be “of a nature” to cause “un-
necessary suffering or superfluous injury.”33 This provision aims to protect 
combatants from needless or inhumane suffering, such as shells filled with 
glass shards that would not be detectable by an x-ray of the wound.34 It is a 
rule that applies solely to combatants, not civilians (who are protected by 
other law of armed conflict provisions).35 Like the “indiscriminate by na-
ture” rule, it sets a high bar; unsurprising, given the forms of violence that 
can lawfully be inflicted upon combatants in armed conflict.  
Third, a weapon system can be deemed illegal per se if the harmful ef-
fects of the weapon are not capable of being “controlled.”36 The rule 
against weapons with uncontrollable harmful effects is paradigmatically 
biological weapons, in which a virus or other biological agent cannot be 
controlled or contained; once released, it goes where it goes. Once again, 
even though many rules of the law of armed conflict prevent the use of 
weapons in circumstances that might have uncontrolled effects, the bar to 
make the weapon itself illegal per se is high. 
None of these rules renders a weapon system illegal per se solely on ac-
count of it being autonomous. If a fully autonomous weapon system were 
supplied with sufficiently reliable parameters and it were able to act on 
them so as to be able to strike specific targets on the same legal terms of 
                                                                                                                      
32. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 276 (weapons reviews “examine only the le-
gality of a weapon system as such, not its use in any particular circumstance.”). 
33. API, supra note 27, art. 35(2). 
34. For more examples, see COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 
JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶ 1419 (Yves Sandoz, 
Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). 
35. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 244. 
36. API, supra note 27, art. 51(4)(c); Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 250 (“[Arti-
cle 51(4)(c)] reflects customary international law. It disallows weapon systems that, despite 
being able to strike their targets accurately, have uncontrollable effects.”). Because the rule 
concerns “effects,” the claim that some might make is that autonomous weapon systems 
are “uncontrollable” because for a weapon system equipped with sophisticated probabilis-
tic programming not every decision taken by the machine would be predictable in ad-
vance, thus would be by definition uncontrolled. But apart from other aspects of control 
of the machine, uses and operations, the rule is about effects that cannot be uncontrolled, 
not an uncontrolled weapon.  
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discrimination that would apply to a human soldier, that the weapon sys-
tem was “autonomous” would not violate the “indiscriminate by nature” 
rule. Although some might view an autonomous weapon system as “un-
controllable,” its effects are not uncontrollable within the meaning of the 
legal provision.37 
Even if a weapon system is not per se illegal, it might still be prohibited 
in some—even many—battlefield environments, or in particular uses on a 
particular battlefield. But in other circumstances, of course, the weapon 
might also be legal. As the ICRC put the point in 2011 with respect to new 
weapon technologies generally, the question is not whether the “new tech-
nologies are good or bad in themselves, but instead what are the circum-
stances for their use.”38  
Targeting law governs the circumstances of the use of lawful weapons 
and includes three fundamental rules: discrimination (or distinction), pro-
portionality and precautions in attack.39 Distinction requires that a combat-
ant, using reasonable judgment in the circumstances, distinguish between 
combatants and civilians, as well as between military and civilian objects.40 
Although use of autonomous weapon systems is not illegal per se, a re-
quirement for their lawful use—the ability to distinguish lawful from un-
lawful targets—might vary enormously from one weapon system’s tech-
nology to another. Some algorithms, sensors or analytic capabilities might 
perform well, others poorly.  
Moreover, these capabilities are measured against particular battlefield 
environments; the “context and environment in which the weapon system 
operates play a significant role in this analysis.”41 Air-to-air combat between 
military aircraft over the open ocean, for example, might one day take place 
between autonomous systems, as the technological pressures for greater 
                                                                                                                      
37. Schmitt and Thurnher are right to conclude that the “likelihood of an autono-
mous weapon system being unlawful per se is very low” on any of the three grounds de-
scribed above. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 250. 
38. ICRC 31ST CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 40.  
39. See IAN HENDERSON, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF TARGETING: MILITARY 
OBJECTIVES, PROPORTIONALITY, AND PRECAUTIONS UNDER ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I 
23–41 (2009). 
40. API, supra note 27, art. 48 (“Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish be-
tween the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military 
objectives . . . .”). 
41. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, The Law that Applies to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 17 AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW INSIGHTS (Jan. 18, 2013), 
www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/4/law-applies-autonomous-weapon-systems. 
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speed, ability to endure torque and inertial pressures, and so on, finally re-
sult in an unmanned craft. As the speed of flight and every other aircraft 
system becomes faster to the point that only an autonomous system can fly 
the plane, at that point and at those speeds the weapon systems may also 
have to be automated in order to operate effectively with the rest of the 
aircraft systems.  
Distinction is highly unlikely to be an issue in that particular operation-
al environment, however, because the combat environment would be lack-
ing in civilians. As Jeffrey Thurnher points out, there may be “situations in 
which an autonomous weapon system could satisfy this rule with a consid-
erably low level ability to distinguish between civilian and military tar-
gets.”42 Yet there would be many operational environments in which meet-
ing the requirements of distinction by a fully autonomous system would be 
very difficult—urban battlefield environments in which civilians and com-
batants are commingled, for example. This is not to say that autonomous 
systems are thereby illegal. Quite the opposite, in some settings their use 
would be legal and in others illegal, depending on how technologies ad-
vance.  
Proportionality requires that the reasonably anticipated military ad-
vantage of an operation be weighed against the reasonably anticipated civil-
ian harms.43 As with the principle of distinction, there are operational set-
tings—air-to-air combat over open water, tank warfare in remote uninhab-
ited deserts, ship antimissile defense, undersea anti-submarine operations, 
for example—in which civilians are not likely to be present and which, in 
practical terms, do not require weighing military advantage against civilian 
harms. Conversely, in settings such as urban warfare, proportionality is 
likely to pose very difficult conditions for machine programming, and it is 
widely recognized that whether and how such systems might one day be 
developed is simply an open question.44 To be fair, many military lawyers 
have questioned whether human soldiers are capable of truly applying this 
ambiguous test either.  
Programming proportionality is not simply a question of sensors or 
computational sophistication in order to reasonably identify a person as a 
lawful target in the sense of distinction. While everyone agrees that civilian 
harm should not be excessive in relation to military advantages gained, the 
                                                                                                                      
42. Id. 
43. The customary law rule is codified in Additional Protocol I. API, supra note 27, 
arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii). 
44. See ICRC 31ST CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 16.  
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comparison is apples and oranges. Although there is a general sense that 
such excess can be determined in truly gross cases, there is no accepted 
formula that gives determinate outcomes in specific cases.45 Some military 
lawyers proceed largely casuistically, building on what was done in prior 
situations and examining similarities and differences.46 Difficult or not, 
proportionality is a fundamental requirement of the law and any completely 
autonomous weapon system would have to be able to address it, though, as 
with distinction, reasonable judgments of proportionality would be highly 
dependent on the operational environment and battlefield in which the 
machine was deployed.47 Again, assessing proportionality is one thing in 
close-in infantry urban warfare, but altogether different in remote uninhab-
ited deserts, in the open ocean or undersea, or circumstances of machine-
on-machine operations where few if any civilians are present. 
Precautions in attack require that an attacking party take feasible pre-
cautions in the circumstances to spare the civilian population.48 Precautions 
and feasibility, it bears stressing, are terms of art in the law of armed con-
flict that confer reasonable discretion on commanders undertaking at-
                                                                                                                      
45. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, THE LAW OF TARGETING 96–97 (2012) (doctrinal dis-
cussion of the difficulties of comparisons in specific cases versus general principles).  
46. As Schmitt notes, human targeting officers in U.S. forces sometimes employ so-
phisticated software programming to estimate likely collateral damage from the employ-
ment of a particular munition in particular circumstances, given assumptions about a vari-
ety of factors. See Michael N. Schmitt, Autonomous Weapon Systems and IHL: A Reply to the 
Critics, HARVARD NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 19 (Feb. 15, 2013), 
http://harvardnsj.org/2013/02/autonomous-weapon-systems-and-international-humanit 
arian-law-a-reply-to-the-critics/. These software tools are merely tools, dependent on the 
assumptions used and only address the likely collateral damage—not the comparison to 
military advantage. See also GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: 
AN OPERATIONAL APPROACH 194 (2012) (“One process for implementing ROE that is 
currently in use in Afghanistan by U.S. forces is the Collateral Damage Estimation Meth-
odology or CDEM. . . . [T]he purpose of the CDEM is to cause the military to do a thor-
ough proportionality analysis and then, depending on the estimated number of civilian 
casualties, seek approval for the attack.”). 
47. Thurnher, supra note 41 (“[F]or the use of an autonomous weapon system to be 
lawful, the system would be expected to reasonably distinguish between combatants and 
civilians . . . given the particular environment and circumstances of the battlefield ruling at 
the time.”). 
48. API, supra note 27, arts. 57, 58; for explanation, see, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 31, 
at 138–40; HENDERSON, supra note 39, at 157–96. 
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tacks.49 The commander’s obligation is grounded in reasonableness and 
good faith, and in “planning, deciding upon or executing attacks, the deci-
sion taken by the person responsible has to be judged on the basis of all 
information available to him at the relevant time, and not on the basis of 
hindsight.”50 Although some precautionary measures might have to be pro-
grammed into a genuinely and fully autonomous weapon system, in reality 
many of the precautions that might be at issue are not so much a question 
of what the weapon system does in a particular missile strike as part of a 
larger operation or battle, but instead are addressed in the planning for the 
overall attack as an operation, including the development of the rules of 
engagement. As such, and for the foreseeable future, the rules of precau-
tions in attack fall upon commanders as they plan how to deploy their 
combat resources in an operation. Technology can be of great assistance in 
modeling likely harm to civilians or civilian objects or in deciding upon the 
munitions or weapon systems (including at some future point, perhaps, 
autonomous systems) to employ, but responsibility for the operation, in-
cluding the weapons used, belongs to the commander.51  
While it is true that for this and many other legal reasons a fully auton-
omous weapon system would likely have to be able to break off or alter an 
engagement—potentially even as it was being launched (in at least some 
circumstances, where “feasible”)—just as a human commander might be 
required to do, precautions in attack operate generally at a level above an 
individual weapon, whether operated by a human soldier or by a computer 
integrated into it, and rely on pre-planning and information obtained be-
forehand. Situational awareness for those directly carrying out the attack is 
often very low, even if the target is visible to them, and, because they do 
not typically have awareness of the entire operation and its parts, they are 
often not in a position to make a judgment as to a change in precautions, 
and so cannot be held to account for a violation of reasonably planned 
precautions. The legal standard, in principle, would be no different for a 
                                                                                                                      
49
 We note that while the United States and Israeli armed forces exercise strict precautions 
in attack, their position on the customary legal status of such obligation is not publicly 
formalized. 
50. See W. Hays Parks, The Protection of Civilians from Air Warfare, 27 ISRAEL YEAR-
BOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 65, 110 (1997) (quoting German declaration on Article 57, 
Protocol I). 
51. See Gregory S. McNeal, Targeted Killing and Accountability, 102 GEORGETOWN LAW 
JOURNAL 681, 739–50 (2014) (discussing the collateral damage estimation and mitigation 
process, and evaluating precautions in attack through weapon selection and use of weap-
ons in targeting and targeted killing operations). 
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machine carrying out only one part of a larger operation, though policy 
might lead to greater caution. Precautions in attack, with respect to new 
weapon technologies, in the long run might turn out to be the most diffi-
cult requirement of targeting law for an autonomous system to meet, at 
least in circumstances in which there are civilians present,52 precisely on 
account of the difficulties of anticipating and pre-planning conditions and, 
if the machine were to be genuinely on its own, identifying and executing 
attacks. But independence for such a machine system, divorced from the 
integration of all levels of planning for an attack and its execution, is frank-
ly a long way away, if not entirely fanciful. 
Many of the battlefield environments for which autonomous weapon 
systems are contemplated today do not involve such considerations, how-
ever; they are not situations with significant civilian presence. Still, con-
sistent with other aspects of the interplay of automation technology and 
the law of armed conflict, incremental changes in technology will push for 
use of these systems in more and varied environments in which civilians 
are indeed present. Legal reviews will likely have to take into account many 
particularized facts—all the permutations of in- and on-the-loop interac-
tions by soldiers with the machine, that, for example, is still short of full 
autonomy, but nonetheless has very large roles for automation.  
Stepping back, it is critically important to understand that before an au-
tonomous weapon system—like any weapon system—is used in a military 
operation, human commanders and those employing the weapon will gen-
erally continue to be expected to exercise judgment about the likely pres-
ence of civilians and the likelihood that they may be inadvertently harmed; 
expected military advantage; particular environmental features or condi-
tions; the weapon’s capabilities, limitations, and safety features; and many 
other factors. It is difficult to draw general conclusions in the abstract 
about the many complex legal issues involved in such scenarios. However, 
in many cases, even though a weapon system may be autonomous, much 
of the required legal analysis would be conducted by human decision mak-
ers who elect whether or not to use it in a specific situation. Whether legal 
requirements are satisfied in a given situation will still depend not simply 
on the machine’s own programming and technical capabilities, but on hu-
man judgments as well. In thinking through these legal issues, it may be 
helpful also to distinguish between human decisions to deploy a system 
                                                                                                                      
52. See William H. Boothby, Some Legal Challenges Posed by Remote Attack, 94 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 579 (2012). 
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(including decisions about settings for the system) in a particular circum-
stance and decisions made by the system itself once deployed. These two 
sets of decisions are linked in complex ways, and making the former deci-
sions appropriately should reduce the possibility for error in the latter.  
In sum there is no reason, in principle, why a highly automated or au-
tonomous system could not satisfy the requirements of targeting law.53 Like 
any otherwise lawful weapon, it depends on the use and the environment. 
Uninhabited deserts are different from urban warfare. Destroying rockets 
in the air—Iron Dome, for example—is different from rural counterinsur-
gency in which entering civilian villages is necessary, not just for bare secu-
rity reasons, but to consolidate political relationships. In practical terms, 
autonomous systems might be better able to satisfy the law in some uses 
and environments than others, but that is not a matter of principle; it is a 
matter of whether and how far technological capability advances relative to 
the legal standard.  
 
V. DEVELOPING AND CULTIVATING LEGAL RULES AND CODES OF 
CONDUCT 
 
The conclusions that autonomous weapon systems do not inherently vio-
late the longstanding and accepted rules of warfare, and that such systems 
can be effectively regulated under these rules, does not mean that this will 
be a simple or straightforward exercise. The advent of autonomous sys-
tems creates new challenges that need to be addressed. 
It is quite rare for an international law-related question to arise be-
fore it actually becomes a real-life dilemma.54 There is therefore a unique 
(although probably short-lived) opportunity to get it right; to develop the 
rules and code of conduct for such systems before they are fielded on the 
battlefields of the world in large numbers. Though primarily procedural, 
the best way to approach this and to effectively adapt the law of armed 
conflict to future autonomous weapons is a three-tiered approach. 
At the highest level, some form of international instrument addressing 
autonomous systems is probably needed eventually. But the instrument 
that is needed is neither a blanket ban on autonomous weapons nor a mor-
atorium on their development and deployment. At its most basic, such an 
                                                                                                                      
53. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 8, at 279–80. 
54. Compare, for example, issues of autonomous weapon systems to cyber warfare is-
sues, where the law is likewise struggling to keep up with technological and real-life devel-
opments. 
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instrument would make clear that autonomous systems are governed by the 
existing rules of warfare, that they are not inherently illegal thereunder and 
that they are subject to the customary law requirements of legal review of 
weapons.  
Such an instrument could go much further, however, elaborating on 
two separate sets of substantive issues. First, it could include some form of 
interpretative application of the law of armed conflict to commanders de-
ploying autonomous systems, explaining what information such command-
ers must have and what questions such commanders must ask before de-
ciding to field the weapons in a given situation. Second, it could include 
rules and guidelines for the development of autonomous systems. Such 
rules and guidelines could be based not only on legal requirements, but also 
on policy considerations. For example, do we want to require all autono-
mous weapon systems to have a human override capability (some form of 
“kill switch”)? Or perhaps we would like all such systems to have a built-in 
self-neutralization mechanism. Perhaps this instrument could include a 
minimum sensory requirement standard for autonomous systems that 
could be required to make reasonably-foreseeable distinction-based deci-
sions on the battlefield?  
This international instrument need not deal with all of these issues at 
once. Indeed, as explained below, a better approach is to reach consensus 
on some core minimum standards, but at the same time to retain some 
flexibility for international standards and requirements to evolve as tech-
nology evolves. Such an instrument is not likely to have compliance trac-
tion with States over time unless it largely codifies standards, practices, pro-
tocols and interpretations that States have converged upon over a period of 
actual development of systems. The process of this convergence will best 
be accomplished if it takes place gradually through informal discussions 
among States, informed by sufficiently transparent and open sharing of 
relevant information, rather than through formal treaty negotiations that if 
initiated too early tend to lock states into rigid political positions. 
Such an international instrument could have many different forms. It 
could be a totally new legal instrument; it could be a new protocol under 
the CCW or it could be a more manual-based approach, similar to the re-
cent Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare,55 but 
involving more direct participation and endorsement by States. Each ap-
                                                                                                                      
55. TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WAR-
FARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013). 
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proach has its own advantages and disadvantages, but a variant on the Tal-
linn Manual approach may be especially appropriate here. That document 
was developed by an international group of legal experts commissioned by 
the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence to develop 
and propose interpretive guidance for States’ and other actors’ considera-
tion. Although the cyber context is different, insofar as there may be great-
er disagreement as to the appropriate legal framework, similar international 
processes—whether involving State representatives or independent experts 
or both—can help foster broad consensus or surface disagreements that 
require resolution with respect to autonomous weapon systems. 
The second tier will be at the national level. All countries, and especial-
ly countries in which autonomous system development is currently ongo-
ing, should promulgate their own national rules and policies addressing the 
two sets of substantive issues mentioned above. Undoubtedly many of the 
details of national rules and policies will need to remain secret, as they will 
involve sensitive matters of military capabilities and practices. States should 
be urged, however, to publish openly their general policies and to promote 
sharing of best practices. A step in this direction was the U.S. Defense De-
partment’s development and publication of a policy directive regulating 
automated and autonomous weapon systems that spells out limits and pro-
cedural requirements with regard to research, development and deploy-
ment of autonomous weapon systems.56 
Finally, the third tier of a regulatory process should comprise the de-
velopers and potential users: the defense industry (including private sector 
developers of component technologies) and responsible militaries of the 
world. The former will need clear guidance as to what types of systems 
they should and should not be developing. The latter need to start thinking 
about methodologies, operating procedures, rules of engagement and other 
operational and doctrinal level rules for the use of autonomous systems. 
While both of these groups will be generally implementing standards and 
rules that flow down from the higher tiers, it is crucial for them to be in-
volved in the discussions at the higher levels, as in many cases only they 
will have a clear understanding of the real technological and operational 
questions and dilemmas that arise. For example, collaboration between pri-
vate sector weapon developers and the militaries that might acquire and 
deploy them will be critical in formulating and implementing effective test-
                                                                                                                      
56. DoD Directive 3000.09, supra note 2. 
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ing and evaluation systems specifically for autonomous weapons.57 It is 
preferable that all three tiers advance in parallel, each drawing upon the 
other in the complicated dialogue involving international and national in-
terests that generally characterizes the development of international law. 
Lawyers knowledgeable in the requirements of weapons legal reviews 
thus need to be engaged with weapon designers and engineers in the pri-
vate sector from the beginning of the development process in order to help 
ensure that weapons law be as much a part of the system’s design require-
ments as any other. Similarly, they must be engaged with military operators 
able to assist them in understanding the intended uses and battlefield envi-
ronments for the system, as well as the capacities and limits of soldiers us-
ing the system and requirements for training of the operators. The devel-
opment—not just the deployment and use—of a weapon system that is 
autonomous (or has an autonomous firing option) requires an “under-
standing of the legal parameters; the engineering design, production, and 
testing (or validation) methods; and the way in which the weapon might be 
employed on the battlefield.”58 While a review conducted during the acqui-
sition process is not the final legal review, the stages of design, demonstra-
tion, manufacture and in-service deployment are “important stages for the 
input of formal legal advice.”59 To be meaningful, though, these legal pa-
rameters must translate into terms of reliability engineering that are “testa-
ble, quantifiable, measurable, and reasonable.”60 
Military lawyers are well aware of these issues and a robust debate over 
the legal review of increasingly automated weapons has been underway in 
internal defense ministry publications and journals dedicated to the law of 
armed conflict for well over a decade. One task is coordination and inte-
                                                                                                                      
57. See REPORT OF ICRC EXPERT MEETING, supra note 7 (“[I]t is not clear how such 
weapons could be adequately tested given the absence of standard methods for testing and 
evaluating autonomous systems.”). Backstrom and Henderson acknowledge the difficul-
ties in testing systems, but add that “one pro-active step that could be taken as part of the 
legal review process is for lawyers to [provide] input [into] the test and evaluation phases 
by identifying areas of legal concern that could then be translated into testable elements.” 
Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: An Overview of Contemporary 
Technological Developments and the Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36 Weapons 
Reviews, 94 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 483, 507 (2012). 
58. Backstrom & Henderson, supra note 57, at 401. 
59. Justin McClelland, The Review of Weapons in Accordance with Article 36 of Additional 
Protocol I, 85 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 397, 401 (2003). 
60. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT OF THE 
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DEVELOPMENTAL TEST & EVALUATION 38 
(2008), available at www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA482504.pdf. 
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gration of review tasks across disciplines and between government defense 
agencies and the private sector, and to address questions about how to 
translate legal requirements into concrete engineering tests. A further coor-
dination task is creating dialogue and cooperation among States and mili-
tary establishments so that internally generated legal standards and re-
quirements and engineering tests help develop informal norms, expecta-
tions, standards and shared understandings that might, at a suitable future 
point, crystallize into concrete national and/or international treaty rules 
with respect to highly automated or autonomous weapons.  
The double challenge here is, on the one hand, for States to apply suf-
ficiently clear and robust standards and rules, under reasonable understand-
ings of their Article 36 obligations, as sophisticated, modern autonomous 
weapon systems are gradually fielded. And, on the other hand, ensure that 
standards and rules under Article 36 that States develop today will be 
equally relevant or adaptable for the future systems which will be devel-
oped ten, twenty, thirty years from now.  
The fundamental principle underlying the gradual development of 
these standards and rules alongside the evolution of automation technolo-
gies, however, should be that what matters is ever greater compliance with 
the core obligations of the law of armed conflict: necessity, distinction, 
proportionality and humanity. Whether the actor on the battlefield is a 
“who” or a “what” is not truly the issue, but rather how well that actor per-
forms according to the law of armed conflict. Debate over standards or 
rules for automated or autonomous systems should remain scrupulously 
neutral as between human or machine, and should affirmatively reject any a 
priori preference for human over machine. Even seemingly indisputable 
calls for a first principle of “meaningful human control” mistake the issue, 
which is lessening the harms of armed conflict within the law by the means 
that are the most effective. The principle of humanity is fundamental, but it 
refers, not to some idea that humans must operate weapons, but instead to 
the promotion of means or methods of warfare that best protect humanity 
within the lawful bounds of war, irrespective of whether the means to that 
end is human or machine or some combination of the two.  
Moreover, as previously suggested, the solutions to the challenges 
posed by autonomous weapons likely lie in a process of gradual interna-
tional legal development that evolves as technology advances. It is not one 
that seeks to predict how technology will or will not evolve, or one that 
tries to pause technological development until a new legal consensus is in 
place. Hitting the pause button on technology, pending consensus on the 
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legal framework to govern it, seems attractive for some of those who have 
concerns about the risks of such technologies. But there already is a general 
framework in place for these emerging weapons—the law of armed con-
flict and its fundamental principles, and the processes for the legal review 
of weapons. 
  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
As increasingly automated—and in some cases fully autonomous—weapon 
systems enter the battlefield or become possible, it is important that inter-
national norms to regulate them head down a path that is coherent and 
practical. Contrary to the claims of some advocates, autonomous weapon 
systems are not inherently illegal or unethical. The technologies involved 
potentially hold considerable promise for making armed conflict more dis-
criminating and causing less harm on the battlefield. They do pose great 
challenges, however, with regard to law of armed conflict rules regulating 
the use of weapons. Those challenges demand international attention and 
special processes for adapting existing law to meet those challenges. 
Rather than seeking to impose, up front, a new set of prohibitory rules 
or seeking to suspend development of autonomous weapon systems pend-
ing a comprehensive agreement on rules to govern them, international reg-
ulation of autonomous weapon systems should begin with the premise that 
the law of armed conflict provides an appropriate general framework. 
States should work to build on that framework through continually-
improving interpretive standards and agreed-upon best practices. There is 
no risk-free course of action, and the three-tiered approach we propose 
offers a way to appropriately and realistically constrain military activities, 
while improving adherence to core law of armed conflict principles.  
 
